

**Principals, Agents and Wartime Sexual Violence:
An Analysis of Variation in Peru, 1980-2002**

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Introduction

Wartime sexual violence has been called one of the most appalling recurring human rights abuses. Governments and international humanitarian and human rights organizations, appropriately horrified by media reports of its continued prevalence in conflicts around the world, have issued condemnations of the practice, formed working groups to examine its causes and develop policy prescriptions for world leaders to prevent its future occurrence. In 2000, for example, the United Nations Security Council issued resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, in which it called upon “all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse...” and emphasized states’ obligations to prosecute those responsible for such acts (UNSC 2000). Eight years later, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urged that the United Nations “can and must push back” against what he characterized as the increasing and in some cases, pandemic, levels of wartime sexual violence. At the same meeting, the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1820, reaffirming its commitment to ending wartime sexual violence (UNSC 2008).

Responding to the calls for action from activists and government officials, the scholarly community has begun to systematically investigate the causes of wartime sexual violence (Cohen 2010, Leiby 2009a, Skjelsbæk 2001, Wood 2006 and 2009). However, because of the methodological and ethical difficulties of doing so, most early studies were limited to a few, well-publicized cases of mass rape (Allen 1996, Bloom 2005, Sharlach 2000, Stiglmayer 1994). The academic and policy communities still know relatively little about the universe of cases, including where, when, and how sexual violence is perpetrated.

This paper is part of my dissertation, which examines the causes of state-perpetrated sexual violence at the sub and cross-national levels in El Salvador and Peru. This paper is a first attempt to determine *whose* interests motivate rape and sexual abuse in times of war. It explores only one half of the debate between opportunistic and strategic explanations of violence, namely that sexual violence is unfortunate, but inevitable during the “chaos of war” when leaders cannot effectively monitor or control the self-interested behavior of their soldiers. That this is the prevailing conventional wisdom, often cited by political and military leaders when confronted with reports of abuse, mandates that the opportunity model of sexual violence be given careful consideration and subjected to rigorous empirical testing. I argue that focusing on sub-national variation is a more fruitful and accurate method of empirical inquiry of the causes of wartime sexual violence. By examining the patterns of perpetration of sexual and other human rights abuses, scholars can evaluate the plausibility of leaders’ claims that they had no knowledge of, did not encourage, and strictly prohibited illegal acts of violence by their militaries.

I find that the profile of sexual violence victims is statistically different from that of other human rights violations. In Peru, victims of sexual violence are both male and female, are more educated, are less likely to be members of rural indigenous communities, and are *not* members of the population to whom soldiers had the most access. Moreover, I find that the military command was present during and permitted a substantial proportion of these

sexual assaults. This evidence demonstrates that opportunism may offer a partial, but ultimately incomplete, explanation of sexual violence during the Peruvian civil war.

Principal-Agent Dilemmas and the Opportunity Model of Wartime Sexual Violence

Principal-agent theory emerged from the rational choice literature on transaction costs. The relationship between principals (leaders) and agents (subordinates) has been used for decades in analyses of social, economic and political phenomena (Arrow 1985, Weber 1958). A principal-agent relationship exists anytime one person is entrusted to act in the interests of another. It is primarily characterized as an asymmetric relationship in which the principal bestows or authorizes an agent to carry out a task or duty on his behalf (either because he is unwilling or unable to do so himself). Owing to its rational-choice roots, principals and agents are assumed to be rational actors who make decisions to maximize their preferences. Both enter into the relationship because they profit from the exchange, the principal by getting something done he otherwise would not have, and the agent by receiving remuneration of some kind (money, social recognition, etc.) for her efforts.

The principal-agent relationship is mutually beneficial. However, when there exists *goal variance* and *information asymmetry* between principals and agents, the exchange may become suboptimal for principals. Goal variance refers to any situation where principals and agents are motivated by different interests. Information asymmetry describes the condition of all relationships based on delegation in which the principal has imperfect information on the decisions and actions of his agents, such that he cannot know with certainty if and how his agents are carrying out the jobs for which they have been contracted. Below, I will first illustrate these dynamics and then demonstrate how the same principles can be applied to military leaders and their soldiers to explain why the latter engage in sexual violence during war.

Perhaps the classical example of the principal-agent dilemma is the relationship between stockholders and managers of a private firm. Corporate management can often run astray from the interests of its shareholders, resulting in outcomes that may be disastrously suboptimal.¹ Like any principal-agent relationship, the one between the stockholder and manager is based on a contract, whether formal or informal, in which the agent (manager) agrees to pursue the principal's (stockholder) goals in exchange for some form of compensation. In return for their initial investment, stockholders expect the value of their shares to increase over time. They expect the firm to be run in a way that will produce long-term growth in earnings and/or dividends, depending on the company. Corporate managers, on the other hand, have incentives to pursue their own preferences for large bonuses, which can lead to choices or policies that undermine the firm's long-term prospects but produce the possibility of large, short-term windfalls. In other words, shareholders and corporate managers do not have the same goals. Additionally, investors

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¹ This is illustrated by the recent scandals involving the Ponzi scheme run by the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities firm and the epic mismanagement and fraud perpetrated by the Enron Corporation.

are far removed from the day-to-day operations of the firm and have limited information on the actions and decisions of the managers. As a result, investors have little control over the firm's management and are in a poor position to ensure that their agents protect their financial interests.

In the context of armed conflict, the principals represent the political and military leadership of the state, while the agents are the individual soldiers and security officers who implement their war strategy. The *opportunity model* argues that agents, and **not** principals have a private interest to engage in sexual abuse **and** principals are unable to effectively circumscribe the agents' self-gratifying, violent behavior. Sexual violence arises because the chaotic circumstances of war provide so-motivated agents the opportunity to commit abuses without the knowledge or consent of their superiors.

In times of war, the normal social and institutional mechanisms that regulate behavior are loosened or destroyed. There exists a general environment of anonymity and permissiveness that allows individual agents to pursue their private interest for violence without fear of detection or retribution from commanding officers. Wartime sexual violence arises when leaders are unable to monitor and control the behavior of agents under their command (Butler et al. 2007). Simply, war increases the *opportunity* for those who are so inclined to commit sexual violence.

More specifically, in times of war state authorities must delegate security tasks to agents, namely soldiers, officers and other members of state security institutions, whose interests and goals frequently differ from their own:

Principals tend to have long-term goals and a broader picture of the conflict in identifying key aims and objectives that they wish to achieve, while agents have shorter-term goals and more localized understanding of the conflict that can clash with the aims and objects of the principal...and they will misrepresent events from the field or conflict for reasons to further their own goals....

(Landman and Godhes 2009, 6)

Agents are generally assumed to be selfish. They are motivated by multiple, often unobservable, interests (Hoover 2006). Soldiers may be motivated by revenge, sexual or other forms of gratification, sadism, greed, group acceptance and peer esteem, or conversely, the avoidance of ridicule or abuse. When conditions permit, soldiers will forsake the goals of their commanders and pursue their own private goals and desires (Butler et al. 2007, Mitchell 2002).² The following is an illustration of opportunistic

² An issue not explored here but worth mentioning is *adverse selection*. Because of the nature of their work, security agencies may attract individuals who are predisposed or have a predilection for violence. This is particularly problematic in times of low recruitment and high demand on the agencies' services. For example, since the onset of the concurrent wars in Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003, the U.S. Armed Forces have struggled to recruit and retain soldiers and marines. To increase the number of new recruits, the military has issued "Moral Waivers" to

violence motivated and carried out by individual agents for self-promoting reasons, not group benefit:

The victim, Felipe*, was targeted for violence because he had been informing the local authorities about Major Roberto Martinez's abuse of power for his own financial gain. Major Martinez paid the Senderistas [members of the Shining Path] 5,000 soles to kill Felipe. On May 5, 1997,... four Senderistas ambushed Felipe as he was driving down the street. The other four passengers in the car were freed; only Felipe was captured, tied up, and taken to the hills, where he was disappeared (CVR Testimony 450222).

In another case, the victim, Josefa, was subjected to both instrumental or strategic violence as well as opportunistic violence. She was detained, along with her father, at DINCOTE (*Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo*, Counter-Terrorist Directorate) on suspicion of membership in the *Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru* (MRTA, Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement). Officers threatened to rape her if her father did not collaborate with them and give them the names of other MRTA rebels. During interrogation sessions, conducted in the presence of commanding officers, Josefa was tortured. At night, however, an officer who had keys to the prisoners' cells would harass and sexually assault her, asking her what kind of panties she wore and if she had ever been with a *real* man before (CVR Testimony 100085, italics are mine).

Observable Implications and Evidence Regarding Opportunity Model

First, the opportunity model implies that sexual violence will be more prevalent in situations of chaos or upheaval, where mal-intentioned individuals can exploit for their own benefit the inability of government or social institutions to monitor their behavior and enforce the norms or laws regarding the use of violence. At the cross-national level this means that the level of sexual violence should increase in times of war, state failure or government collapse, or periods of great economic, political or social instability. This hypothesis is supported by Butler et al. (2007) and Green (2006), who find evidence that armed conflict increases the prevalence of sexual violence, as does the intensity of the conflict.³ While not tested here, future research will apply this same logic to the sub-

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allow the entrance of those with criminal records, a factor that previously disqualified an individual from military service. According to a 2008 article in *Army Times*, one out of every eight Army recruits requires such a waiver, a rate more than double that in 2004 (Michaels 2008). While the Armed Forces assert that most waivers are granted for misdemeanor convictions, others were given to violent felons, including those convicted of making terrorist threats, sexual assault, child abuse, and maiming (Schor 2008). Lilly (2007) has studied wartime rape perpetrated by the U.S. military since World War II and found it to be associated with poor recruitment and pre-screening of recruits. Specific hypotheses regarding the recruitment strategies of armed groups will not be tested here because I do not have access to individual-level data on soldiers' behavior and careers.

* All names of victims and alleged perpetrators of violence are replaced.

³ Green finds that all, except for the presence of inter-state conflict, increase the probability that a country experiences a collective rape episode. The absence of a significant relationship between

national level and compare the prevalence of sexual violence during and immediately following battles or violent attacks to the levels of such violence during occupations.

Another implication of the theory is that sexual violence should correlate temporally and spatially with other forms of violence. As Wood (2010) states, “opportunity to loot and rape is also opportunity to kill” (301). The following case, recounted by another soldier, describes the behavior of one Sub-Oficial de Tercera in the Peruvian Army (equivalent to E-7 Sergeant First Class in the U.S. Army) while deployed from Lima to Tingo María, the capital of Huánuco region. It illustrates how opportunistic sexual violence may coincide with looting, extortion, and other self-promoting crimes. He is described as a “charmer” who “loved the people.”

...We didn't have anything to do. We weren't on patrol or anything. He was on guard and we controlled the bridge to enter the Los Laureles Army Base. We weren't on patrol, nothing. He saw a girl that was really nice. He didn't have anything to do, and she was alone. He took her below the bridge and raped her. The woman denounced him to the police chief. She said he was abusive, too impulsive, that he treated the people poorly and robbed everyone too.

(CVR Testimony 100168).

Wartime sexual violence occurs in a variety of locations and contexts – in homes, fields, state-run detention facilities, rebel camps, and in refugee or internally displaced persons camps. However, if sexual violence is the result of opportunistic agents fulfilling their own desires for violence rather than the state's strategic interests, it should be more prevalent in the field where direct supervision over individuals' behavior is limited. Commanders' information disadvantage is likely to be greatest when they must delegate responsibilities and authority to their subordinates *and* when soldiers are geographically separated and distant from the watchful eye of superior officers. Therefore, sexual violence will be more likely to occur when soldiers are deployed to the “field” – to battlefields or combat zones that are far from command centers. We should observe a preponderance of cases in low visibility, private or secluded locations, such as abandoned buildings or remote areas, such as mountains or woods.⁴

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interstate war and collective rape, she argues, is likely due to the relatively small number of international wars between 1980 and 2003 as well as the evolution of combat in such conflicts that dramatically reduces the interactions between militaries and civilian populations, as compared to civil wars (2006, 140-142). However, combat operations in international counterinsurgency wars, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, require almost constant interactions and sometimes cohabitation between soldiers and civilians. Additional research on the prevalence of sexual violence during such conflicts is necessary.

⁴ Butler et al. provides weak preliminary support for the proposition that sexual violence is more likely to occur where agents are given greater discretionary powers, where monitoring of and accountability for behavior is low (2007). It is a single-year study that uses democracy, gross national income (GNI), and levels of corruption to indirectly measure the availability of information to leaders on their subordinates' behavior, public

If wartime sexual violence is the result of the inability of the military or political leadership to control its self-interested agents, there should be evidence to indicate that leaders oppose the use of such violence. In one case, for example, soldiers dispatched to Huánuco discussed the absence of sexual violence because everyone knew that the commander in charge was opposed to it.

We were all tired. We were patrolling by the highway when a woman came running towards us. We pointed our guns at her. She was carrying an FAL [Light Automatic Rifle]. We captured her [but] she was not tortured or raped because she gave us information on “Camarada Clay,” and because Lt. Quispe was opposed to it.
(CVR Testimony 100168).

Similarly, sexual violence should be minimal in situations where there is a higher degree of control and oversight, as in prisons, military bases or other institutional establishments. In these state-run facilities, it is reasonable to presume that widespread human rights violations cannot occur without the knowledge of commanding officers. There should be limited or no cases of sexual violence committed in the presence of commanding officers. This directly precludes the participation of such officials. The following case illustrates how ineffective command control can lead to excessive abuses by security officers.

Fernando was captured by the soldiers and taken to the military base in Grau [Apurímac region], where he was tortured severely. The family went to the District Attorney’s office to file a formal complaint against twenty-four of the soldiers from the base, including Lt. Sanchez [equivalent to 1st Lieutenant officer in the U.S. Army] and Sub-Oficial Alferez [equivalent to E-9 Sergeant Major in the U.S. Army]. The Captain of the base was not present when the soldiers committed the abuses, and had no knowledge of their actions. When presented with the report from the District Attorney’s office, the Captain punished Lt. Sanchez and Sub-Oficial Alferez and ordered them to not abuse the prisoners any more. This worsened the situation, however. When the Captain left the base, the two soldiers returned to his cell and beat him almost to death in revenge.
(CVR Testimony 500145).

Even though the torture of Fernando took place in a state-run detention facility, it is clear that the officer in charge did not know or condone the use of violence against detainees at

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sector wages, and the willingness of public servants to exploit their positions for their own benefit, respectively. The authors argue that financial corruption, “deals with the financial rewards that public officials extract from performing or not performing their duties. High levels of financial corruption reflect a general absence of monitoring, accountability, and control in a political system and a high degree of agent discretion to pursue hidden actions” (Butler et al. 2007, 674). While their findings are not specific to armed conflict situations, the authors contend that the same dynamic is applicable to the state armed forces.

the military base. When presented with information of such violence, he appropriately punished those responsible. To the extent that sexual and other forms of violence occur in contexts such as this, the opportunity model presents a compelling explanation.

Additionally, where access, and thus opportunity is constant, there should be no observable patterns of targeting individuals for sexual violence according to their social, political, or ethnic identities (Goldstein 2003, Leiby 2009a, Skjelsbæk 2001). To the extent that particular subgroups live in geographically contested zones, they may be at greater risk for sexual violence. This may be the case for some ethnic groups that because of cultural and economic ties to the land are concentrated in geographically specific locations. However, it is less clear that the same could be said for members of opposition political parties, unions, university students or social activists. Therefore, I argue that opportunistic sexual violence will appear random with respect to the victim's identity.⁵

Lastly, this theory presumes that, given the same opportunities and assuming the same penchant for self-promotion, most agents (usually assumed to be men) will rape, *and* all armed groups within a given society will equally participate in sexual violence.⁶ These hypotheses are not explicitly tested in Butler et al. (2007). However, Cohen (2010) and Wood (2006) find that wartime sexual violence is often asymmetrical – it is often perpetrated by one side of the conflict, but not reciprocated by the other.⁷ Not all armed groups have access to civilian populations or the same opportunities to engage in private violence. Groups that are geographically distanced from central command and/or that have loose or weak organizational hierarchies with minimal surveillance of member behavior should engage in sexual violence more often. In addition, individuals within a group with access and opportunity should equally engage in sexual violence.

Similar criteria as those outlined above were used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to determine the level of responsibility and participation of the central government in the commission of mass sexual violence. That sexual violence manifested itself in similar ways in geographically distant regions of the country; that victims appeared to be targeted; and that many offenses were perpetrated in official detention centers indicated that the state's use of sexual violence during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was planned and purposeful. Table 1 below summarizes the observable implications of the opportunity model, the literature that speaks to each, and if it will be explicitly tested in the present analysis.

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⁵ Arguably, patterns of perpetration may appear if individual agents are more inclined to target particular individuals for violence because of previously held biases.

⁶ Implicit to the opportunity model, as well as some feminist explanations of sexual violence, is the assumption that all men will engage in rape. In her oft-cited work on the subject, Susan Brownmiller argues “rape is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which *all* men keep *all* women in a state of fear” (1975, 38 italics in original).

⁷ A notable outlier to this trend is the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where journalists and human rights activists have noted with horror the extent to which almost all of the armed groups in the country have engaged in sexual abuses (Hochschild 2009, McCrummen 2009).

Summary of Opportunity Model of Wartime Sexual Violence			
Theoretical Hypothesis	Sexual violence (and other forms of political violence) is carried out for private (not group) reasons when individuals have the opportunity to do so		
Testable Hypothesis		Literature	Tested
	Given the same opportunity, all members of an armed group (or all men) will commit sexual violence	Butler et al. 2007 Mitchell 2004 Brownmiller 1975	N
	Given the same opportunity, all armed groups will participate in sexual violence	Cohen 2010	Y
	Sexual violence will increase in times of war	Butler et al. 2007 Green 2006	N
	Sexual violence will correlate over time with other forms of violence	Leiby 2009a Wood 2010	Y
	Sexual violence will correlate across space with other forms of violence	Leiby 2009a Wood 2010	Y
	Sexual violence will be absent or limited in state-run detention facilities	Leiby 2009a	Y
	Sexual violence will not be perpetrated by, in the presence of, or with the knowledge of commanding officers	Leiby 2009a	Y
	Sexual violence will not be targeted against "opponents of the state;" it will appear random in regard to victim profile	Leiby 2009a	Y
	Leaders will properly investigate cases of sexual violence		N

Table 1 Opportunity Model of Wartime Sexual Violence: Observable Implications and Literature

Data Collection and Procedures

Data used in this study were collected over the course of 12 months from the archives of the *Comisión para la Verdad y Reconciliación del Perú* (CVR, Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission) in Lima, Peru. They come from the testimonies of victims, witnesses and their loved ones. In addition to demographic data on the interviewer, the deponent, and any victims or perpetrators of violence mentioned, each file also includes a qualitative description of the event(s) being reported. These narratives are generally 5 to 15 pages in length, but may span upwards of 50 pages. Each begins with a description of life before the event in question – what was life like in the community before the war; prior to the event was there a presence of the armed forces and/or Shining Path or the MRTA; did the deponent hear about, witness or experience any previous attacks or episodes of violence? The next section of the narrative describes, often in great detail, the violent events and human rights abuses that the deponent wishes to denounce to the CVR. Details regarding “who did what to whom,” including the sequencing of events, and the exact location and context in which the violence occurred, are recorded (Ball 1996).

Using these records, I created a new dataset on political violence, including sexual violence, during the Peruvian civil war (1980-2002). I randomly sampled and read approximately 12 percent (2,100) of the testimonies collected by the CVR. Each testimony within the sample was read and information on the identity of victims, alleged perpetrators, and the type of violation was recorded in a database constructed using the victim-violation-perpetrator as the unit of analysis.⁸ I collected data on 12 forms of political violence: detention, forced disappearance, extrajudicial execution, battle-related death, injury, forced recruitment, kidnapping, torture, and sexual violence. Sexual violence is defined as any act of a sexual nature aimed at attacking the victim's sexual and/or gender identity. I recorded information on 8 forms of sexual violence: rape, gang rape, sexual torture, sexual mutilation, sexual humiliation, sexual coercion, forced abortion, and other unspecified types of sexual violence (see Appendix A for a list and definition of all violations). Additional details, such as qualitative descriptions of preceding events and the context in which the violence was perpetrated, were recorded for each case. I paid particular attention to such key facts as how the victim came to be targeted for violence, what s/he was doing at the time of the attack, who was present during the commission of the violation, and exactly where the violence was perpetrated.

In the previous sections, I discussed one theory of wartime sexual violence – the opportunity model. Where appropriate, I provided archetypical cases that illustrate the key mechanisms of the theory. However, cases like these are rare. It is seldom possible to classify a case of violence as *purely* opportunistic or strategic. The complexity of large-scale violent events does not fit well into social scientific categories of violence. Therefore, the analysis that follows explores the nuances and multiplicity of causal process of violence during the Peruvian civil war. It discusses the variation in the types, victims and perpetrators of violence, paying particular attention to the differences (if any) between sexual violence and other forms of political violence.

Repertoires of Violence during the Peruvian Civil War

Types of Violence

There are 20,089 human rights violations recorded in the database. It is interesting to note that despite the emphasis in the conflict studies literature on lethal acts of violence, less than half of the violations recorded resulted in the death (or presumed death in the case of disappearances) of the victim (see Figure 2 below).⁹ The most frequent forms of violence were extrajudicial execution and massacres (14 and 26 percent, respectively), kidnapping and detention (16 and 13 percent, respectively), and torture (14 percent). Like most civil wars in the 20th century, the data indicate that civilians were much more likely to be killed than armed combatants during the Peruvian civil war. Individuals who lost their

⁸ Any time the victim, violation, *or* the perpetrator changed, a new observation was entered into the database.

⁹ It is important to note that while 62 percent of victims in the database were killed, this seldom occurred in isolation of other human rights violations. As a result, the majority of violations observed are non-lethal.

life during the war, were much more likely to be murdered or killed in a massacre of unarmed persons than they were to die on the battlefield. In addition, those who died, on or off of the battlefield, were much more likely to die during collective acts of violence than in isolated or targeted attacks.

Most violence occurred between 1984 and 1989 in the central sierra region of Peru (see Figures 4 and 5 below). By far, the most affected department was Ayacucho, where the Shining Path originated and began their revolutionary war against the state. Also impacted by the violence were the departments of Junín, Huánuco, and Huancavelica, each with significant indigenous populations. Geographically and qualitatively distinct from the violence of the mountainous terrain of the Andean sierra, is the violence that struck the coastal department of Lima. In the capital city, the Shining Path and the MRTA frequently attacked buildings that either directly or symbolically represented the traditional power base of the economic and political elite in Peru. Targets included: foreign embassies and corporations, the private residences of political leaders, political party headquarters, particularly those of the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (American Revolutionary Popular Alliance, APRA), and commercial centers.

In addition to these assaults, many of which occurred in the capitalist business sectors of San Borja, San Isidro and Miraflores, both the state armed forces and the Shining Path also perpetrated acts of violence against *los pueblos jóvenes*, the densely populated shantytowns on the outskirts of Lima (see Figure 1 below). These communities arose in the 1940s and 1950s as people from the sierra migrated to the coast in search of economic opportunities. The population of these communities began to swell in the early 1980s as violence drove families from the mountains to the coast. Los pueblos jóvenes are characterized by poorly constructed homes and a fundamental lack of basic infrastructure and resources, such as clean water and electricity.¹⁰ Among those heavily targeted by the state *and* the Shining Path were Villa El Salvador, San Juan de Miraflores, and Villa María del Triunfo.

¹⁰ For example, the National Institute for Statistics and Information (INEI) in Peru estimates that approximately 35 percent of the population in Villa María del Triunfo does not have access to water, 23 percent does not have access to electricity, and 15 percent suffer from malnourishment (INEI 2002).



Figure 1 Villa El Salvador, Lima, Peru 2010

Beyond geography, important insights into the motivations and causes of violence can be drawn from the precise location and context in which it occurs. Most human rights violations occurred outside of state-run detention facilities (90 percent), in a public venue (62 percent) and were not committed in an attempt to obtain “actionable intelligence” on the opposition (95 percent). Among the most common sites of violence were community plazas or squares, streets, churches and schools, and markets. Often violence was perpetrated in front of an audience, with the explicit intent of terrorizing those present and forced to watch. In fact, the Shining Path would often gather the members of a community together before performing a *juicio popular* (mock trial) on someone accused of betraying the revolution.

Sexual violence comprised about 4 percent of all human rights violations during the Peruvian civil war. There are 745 cases of sexual violence recorded in the database.¹¹ While I employ a broader definition of sexual violence than most scholars (Cohen 2010, Green 2006, Wood 2006 and 2009), it is important to note that the vast majority of these acts (almost 70 percent) include at least one type of sexual violence that is recognized by the International Criminal Court as a war crime and/or crime against humanity.¹² The most frequent forms of sexual violence were rape and gang rape (43 percent), sexual humiliation (33 percent), and sexual torture (11 percent). Similar to the findings of others (Cohen 2010), approximately 30 percent of rapes committed during the war were gang rapes. Unlike other conflicts, such as in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, El Salvador or Guatemala, there is little evidence that women were either forcibly impregnated by their sexual attackers or forced to abort fetuses they were already carrying (see Figure 3 below).

¹¹ Because individual victims may suffer more than one type of sexual violation during any given act of sexual violence, the total number of sexual violations is 900.

¹² For a detailed discussion of the methodological choice to define sexual violence broadly, please see Leiby 2009b.


Although the frequency of sexual violence appears to generally correlate with the occurrence of other types of political violence over time (with the most violent period being between 1984-1989), there is a statistically significant difference in the timing of sexual and other types of violence (Pearson $\chi^2(22) = 100.5615, p < 0.001$). Given the distribution of human rights violations over time, sexual violence was less frequent than expected in the years 1984 and 1989 and more frequent than expected in the years 1987, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1998 and 2000.¹³

Sexual violence occurred in different departments than other forms of political violence (Pearson $\chi^2(22) = 344.7128, p < 0.001$). Sexual violence was most frequent in Ayacucho (32 percent), Apurímac (16 percent), Lima (13 percent), Huánuco (7 percent) and Huancavelica (6 percent). More interesting is comparing the ratio of sexual to non-sexual forms of violence across departments. Those departments that stand out as having a disproportionately high (and higher than the national average) rate of sexual violence are: Pasco, Piura, Cusco, Apurímac, Ica and Lima.¹⁴ Those areas where the per capita ratio of sexual to other forms of violence is higher than the national per capita ratio requires explanation by looking in greater depth at the discipline of troops that were stationed in these regions, the officers who were in charge and their ability to effectively command their soldiers, and the conflict dynamics within each department. Due to time limits, these elements are not discussed here, but will comprise a substantial portion of the dissertation chapter on Peru.

Unlike other forms of political violence, sexual violence was largely committed in private, away from watchful eyes (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 74.1128, p < 0.001$). Most often, this occurred in the victim's home or in secluded natural environments, such as woods and mountains. More frequently than expected, sexual violence was perpetrated in state-run detention facilities (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 517.8205, p < 0.001$). That sexual violence occurs more frequently in detention centers does not necessarily suggest that the violence was perpetrated for instrumental, group reasons, as the case of Josefa above illustrates. When isolated, cases like these may occur for purely opportunistic, self-gratifying reasons. When there is a pattern of frequent excessive abuses, it suggests that leaders (at some level of the political-military hierarchy) know that such violence is taking place and *either* they cannot control their agents *or* they choose not to.

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¹³ While in 1998 and 2000 sexual violence was more frequent than predicted, the result is based on a relatively small number of observations, and thus should be interpreted with caution.

¹⁴ In fact, the highest ratios of sexual to other forms of political violence are found in the departments of Loreto and Lambayeque. This is due, however, to the overall very low levels of all types of violence observed in each region.



Figures 2-3 Political and Sexual Violence in Peru, 1980-2002




Figure 4 Political and Sexual Violence in Peru, 1980-2002



Figure 5 Ratio of Sexual to Political Violence, per 100,000 people, by Department¹⁵

¹⁵ Per capita ratios based on 1981 census.

Victim Profile¹⁶

In this section, I will describe the general profile of a victim of violence during the Peruvian civil war, and then consider the ways in which victims of sexual violence differed from this broader victim population. Included in the database are 14,662 unique victims, individuals who suffered at least one of the forms of political violence described above. According to testimonial accounts, the vast majority (73 percent) of victims experienced a single form of violence. Twenty-six percent of victims experienced two or three forms of violence. About one percent of victims reported suffering between four and ten forms of violence.

Most victims of political violence during the civil war were married or partnered men of young adulthood or middle age, who had some level of primary or elementary education, were peasants by occupation, spoke both Quechua and Spanish and practiced Catholicism (see Figures 6-13 below). Most victims did not report belonging to any social, cultural or political organizations,¹⁷ but of those who did, the most common affiliations were to agricultural cooperatives or other peasant organizations, labor unions, religious organizations, and neighborhood associations.¹⁸ Reflective of the state's *and* the Shining Path's exclusionary ideologies and security doctrines, victims were frequently accused of being terrorists or "traitors of the revolution," or both. Finally, as the war continued, it became more and more common for victims of political violence to report having suffered a previous attack against themselves or a loved one, having witnessed such an attack, or having attempted to file a formal denunciation of abuse with the state security/legal apparatus or a human rights organization. This was reported to be the case for 11 percent of victims.

Victims of sexual violence differed from victims of other human rights violations in substantively meaningful and statistically significant ways. There were 710 unique victims of sexual violence, each of whom suffered between one and four types of sexual violation. Most were married Catholic women between the ages of 25 and 44, with at least an

¹⁶ The terms victim and perpetrator are used throughout to refer to attributions of identity at a particular moment in time as it relates to the violation of an individual's human rights. These identities are fluid and dynamic, as are the concepts of "innocence" and "guilt." The same individual that may at one moment be an agent of violence, and thus a perpetrator, can at another moment be a victim of human rights abuse. Particularly with regard to sexual violence, my use of the term "victim," is not intended to reinforce the stigma of an individual who has suffered sexual violence, nor is it to deny or minimize the agency, power and resistance of the person.

¹⁷ It is likely that participation in social, cultural and political organizations is dramatically underreported, as such memberships were highly politicized during the war, and often became the basis of targeting individuals for violence.

¹⁸ In fact, the most commonly reported organizational memberships were to armed organizations, including the Shining Path, the MRTA, the state armed forces, or the *Comités de Autodefensa* (CADs, Civilian Self-Defense Committees). I report organizational affiliations excluding these groups to reflect the most common types of social and political mobilization prior to the civil war.

elementary-level education, and who spoke both Spanish and Quechua. However, within this general characterization, there is important variation.

While the vast majority of sexual violence victims were women, 29 percent were men, a figure far greater than previously thought or predicted by the literature on wartime sexual violence. Interestingly, the ways in which men and women were sexually victimized were also quite different. Of those who reported being sexually assaulted, women were most likely to be raped or gang raped (62 percent), forcibly stripped or otherwise sexually humiliated (15 percent), or sexually tortured (10 percent). On the other hand, men were most likely to be humiliated and mocked in sexually explicit ways (54 percent), sexually tortured (18 percent), or have their genitals removed or otherwise permanently disfigured (13 percent).¹⁹

The vast majority (between 72 and 75 percent) of victims could read and write. Victims of sexual violence and other forms of political violence differed significantly in their level of education (Pearson $\chi^2(4) = 61.5363, p < 0.001$).²⁰ While most victims, regardless of the type of violation, reported having some primary-level education (47 percent), victims of sexual violence were less likely than expected to have an elementary-level education. Additionally, victims of sexual violence were about three times more likely than expected to have a university degree or some advanced technological training.

Sexual and political violence victims also differed according to their marital status (Pearson $\chi^2(3) = 11.6965, p < 0.01$). Most victims of any type of human rights violation were married or partnered at the time of the abuse.²¹ Victims of sexual violence, however, are more likely than expected to be single.

In Peru, an individual's mother tongue is often used as a proxy for his/her ethnic identity. Most victims of violence during the war reported Quechua as their mother tongue (70 percent). An important distinction should be made, however, between individuals who continue to speak only Quechua (40 percent) and those who later learned Spanish (60 percent), as the latter may imply a different socio-economic or political positioning within Peruvian society.²² Regarding language, there is a significant difference between victims of

¹⁹ The figures reported here refer to the percentage of all sexual violations against men (or women) that fall under each category.

²⁰ All reported significance values refer to χ^2 tests where the null hypothesis (H_0) is that there is no significant difference between victims who are sexually violated and those who are not.

²¹ Of those who reported being married or partnered, most were not formally married. In addition to the cost of the wedding ceremony itself, many citizens in Peru cannot afford to travel and pay for a proper, legal identification card (particularly, in isolated, rural areas), which is required to be formally married. As a result, there has been a longstanding tradition of *compañerismo*, or informal partnering. More recently, in Lima, for those who can afford it, couples that wish to be formally married often do so in mass ceremonies to offset some of the costs.

²² My coding of victim language differs slightly from the CVR's four-way categorical variable of mother tongue. The CVR categorized victims' mother tongue as either: (1) Spanish, (2)

sexual and victims of other forms of abuse (Pearson $\chi^2(4) = 22.1602$, $p < 0.001$). This is due largely to the fact that victims of sexual violence are more likely than expected to speak Spanish as their mother tongue, a finding that does not support the CVR's profile of victims of sexual violence.

Victims of sexual violence were also much more likely than expected to be housewives (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 25.7674$, $p < 0.001$). This is not surprising, however, given the gender distribution of sexual violence victims and that this occupational category is gender specific. Lastly, victims of sexual violence are much less likely to be soldiers, police officers or otherwise work as a state security officer (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 16.1899$, $p < 0.001$). Members of the armed forces who enter into the database as victims of violence are much more likely to suffer lethal forms of violence, particularly battle-related deaths or extrajudicial executions than sexual violence. Again, this is not surprising given that the state was responsible for 88 percent of all sexual violations perpetrated during the war (see discussion below), and the extreme infrequency of reported acts of sexual violence perpetrated by the military against its own members.²³

Victims of sexual violence were less likely to report being the member of a social, political or religious organization than were victims of other human rights violations

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Quechua, (3) some other indigenous or native language, or (4) some other language. Instead of mother tongue, my coding scheme more closely reflects the language(s) spoken by the victim: (1) Spanish only, (2) Quechua only, (3) Spanish and Quechua, (4) some other indigenous or native language, or (5) some other language.

²³ In fact, there are no recorded cases of members of the armed forces perpetrating sexual violence against other members of the *regular* armed forces. There are, however, a few seemingly isolated cases, where members of the CADs are targeted for sexual violence, often because they come under the suspicion of the military. Emblematic of these cases, Alfonso and his wife Isidora, both members of the CAD in Chiclayo (in the Lambayeque region), were taken from their home on December 1, 1991 by members of the counter-terror police, DINCOTE (*Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo*, Counter-Terrorist Directorate). They were accused of being members of the MRTA rebel group. Before being transferred to the offices of DINCOTE and later to prison, both were taken to the beach, a favorite locale of DINCOTE officers to commit violence due to its seclusion and darkness. On the beach, both were stripped and tortured. The police threatened to rape Isidora if Alfonso did not tell them what they wanted to hear. Alfonso repeatedly told the officers that he did not know anything about the MRTA or its members. The police raped Irene in front of her husband and beat him until he was unconscious. Present and participating in the acts were DINCOTE Captain Casas and police Lieutenant Alberto Velasquez. Isidora was later released, but Arturo was convicted of crimes of terrorism at a faceless military tribunal and sentenced to 20 years in prison where he remains today. Cases such as this one, however, are uncommon, as indicated by the fact that sexual violence victims are significantly (20 times) less likely to be members of CADs than expected, given their overall representation within the database (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 21.5065$, $p < 0.001$). In other words, members of CADs who enter into the database as victims of violence are much more likely to suffer some form of lethal violence than non-lethal violence, particularly sexual violence.

(Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 29.5258, p < 0.001$). As mentioned above, there is reason to suspect that people were reluctant to admit affiliations with such organizations for fear that it may make them a target of state suspicion and repression. Victims of sexual violence are more often reported as members of labor unions, developmental or assistance-based organizations (such as the *Vaso de Leche* program that provides a glass of milk to school children in rural communities), or religious and cultural organizations than is expected. The first two relationships, while statistically significant, are based on relatively small *N*s and should be interpreted with caution. Lastly, given the overall number of Shining Path recruits in the database, it is surprisingly infrequent how often they report being the victims of sexual violence (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 34.0166, p < 0.001$). In general, sexual violence was much more likely to be targeted against civilians than it was combatants (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 80.1295, p < 0.001$).²⁴

Victims of sexual violence experienced, on average, more violations of their human rights (Pearson $\chi^2(8) = 2.5, p < 0.001$). It was quite rare for an individual to be targeted for sexual, and no other forms of violence. As a result, victims of sexual violence were much more likely to experience two to ten human rights violations. Interestingly, victims of sexual violence were much less likely to be killed after the assault (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 43.1823, p < 0.001$; Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 205.4525, p < 0.001$). Victims of sexual violence were three times more likely than predicted to have suffered a previous violation of their human rights (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 83.3605, p < 0.001$). They were also more likely than expected to know someone who was previously assaulted, to have witnessed an attack, or to have filed a formal denunciation or criminal report of violence to the state security forces or a human rights organization (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 56.1502, p < 0.001$).


This profile differs significantly from what the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported regarding victims of sexual violence. In the final report, the CVR characterized victims of sexual violence as almost exclusively young women (99%),²⁵ between the ages of 10 and 29, who completed some level of elementary education and whose mother tongue was Quechua (CVR 2003). The data presented here support the CVR's conclusion that many victims of sexual violence were female Quechua-speakers who lived in rural Andean communities and who did domestic and agricultural work. There is another type of victim, however, that is not captured by the CVR's report. This person, whether male or female, is generally older, more educated, resides in urban centers, speaks Spanish, and has become the target for sexual violence because of his/her political

²⁴ “Civilians” and “combatants” are defined according to the Geneva Convention (III) on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Part I, Article 4, Sections 1, 2, 3, and 6.
<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/9ac284404d38ed2bc1256311002afd89/2f681b08868538c2c12563cd0051aa8d!OpenDocument>

²⁵ In the CVR's final report, it indicated that 98 percent of sexual violence victims were women and 2 percent were men. Examining the CVR's database (*Base de Datos de la Comisión para la Verdad y Reconciliación*, BDCVR) reveals only one case (not the eleven mentioned in the final report) of sexual violence against a man. Accordingly, men comprised less than 1 percent of the victims of sexual violence recorded by the CVR.

activities or affiliations. In these cases, sexual violence is often used as a method of torture to punish, coerce or interrogate the victim, and occurs within state-run detention facilities.

More importantly, the evidence presented above indicates that victims of sexual violence were significantly different than victims of non-sexual human rights violations. Individuals were not randomly targeted for sexual violence as the opportunity model would suggest. Victims of sexual violence were often highly educated, residents of urban centers who participated in activities labeled by the state as “subversive.” Such activities include unionizing or protesting state human rights abuses. Because of the tradition of the Shining Path to recruit young members from schools, even high school and university teachers came under the suspicion of the state. This finding, that sexual violence is targeted against particular subgroups within the population, is preliminary and alone cannot refute with certainty the opportunity model of violence. In the following section, I explore an additional piece of the puzzle – who commits sexual violence during times of war?



Figures 6-13: Demographic Profile of Victims of Sexual and Other Types of Violence in Peru, 1980-2002

Perpetrator Profile

The state armed forces participated in 61 percent of all human rights violations committed during the war, while non-state armed groups participated in 36 percent of all human rights violations.²⁶ The state armed forces, however, are responsible for 88 percent of all sexual abuse, a figure significantly higher than expected (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 233.3344$, $p < 0.001$) (see figures 14 and 15 below for a breakdown of violations committed by state and non-state actors). The most frequent forms of sexual violence engaged in by the state were: rape and gang rape (42 percent), sexual humiliation (34 percent), and sexual torture (12 percent). The only significant difference in violation type according to perpetrator group is that non-state armed actors were significantly more likely to commit acts of sexual mutilation and disfigurement than were state armed actors (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 42.4294$, $p < 0.001$). Sexual mutilation comprised 20 percent of all acts of sexual violence perpetrated by non-state armed groups.

Within the state armed forces, there is great variation in the levels and types of violence perpetrated by the regular army, the national police, and specialized counter-terror squads. The army perpetrated more sexual violence than any other state armed group (32 percent). Most often, soldiers committed rape (32 percent), gang rape (17 percent), and sexual humiliation (40 percent). Contrast this with the patterns of sexual abuse by the *Policía Nacional del Perú* (PNP, Peruvian National Police), which did not commit rape or gang rape nearly as often (14 and 7 percent of all PNP-perpetrated sexual violence), but rather frequently sexually humiliated (42 percent) and engaged in the sexual torture of prisoners (almost 20 percent). It is plausible that sexual violence perpetrated by soldiers is more likely to be opportunistic than that perpetrated by police officers. Soldiers are more likely to operate in small groups that are deployed to geographically distant areas for prolonged periods of time. It is harder to make the argument that sexual torture,

²⁶ This is significantly different from the final report of the CVR, which stated that the Shining Path alone was responsible for 54 percent of all lethal violence during the war. There are two reasons for this disparity in findings. First, all battle-related deaths and battle massacres in my database are reported as having at least two responsible parties to represent each of the combating forces. During active combat situations it is difficult to discern who exactly was responsible for any given death or injury. Because my data come from victim, witness and their loved ones' testimonies it is almost impossible to attribute each battle-related incident to one, specific armed group. Thus, I record all armed groups involved in the battle as perpetrators of battle-related violations. Second, the CVR did not record violence against any person for whom they could not identify by first and last name. Because of the clandestine nature of rebel groups, it is very rare that the names of individual members are known (the exception being the top leadership or others of prominence and notoriety within the group). As a result, the extrajudicial execution, torture or other human rights violations against members of the Shining Path and MRTA are rarely included in the CVR's database, resulting in an overall depression of the percentage of violations attributable to the state.

violence that requires access to specialized equipment and is often executed methodically, is opportunistic.

Of greater interest to the opportunity model is the notable absence of sexual violence on the part of those organizations that are deliberately designed to operate outside of the command control hierarchy of the armed forces, namely the CADs (*Comités de Autodefensa Civil*, Civilian Self-Defense Committees),²⁷ also known as the *rondas*, or paramilitary groups such as the Comando Rodrigo Franco (Rodrigo Franco Command)²⁸ or the Grupo Colina (Colina Group).²⁹ The CADs were indicated in 4.2 percent of all violence perpetrated during the civil war, but only 2.7 percent of all sexual violence.³⁰ When members of CADs did engage in sexual violence, they were significantly more likely to commit rape or gang rape than other forms of sexual abuse; 92 percent of all sexual violence perpetrated by CADs was rape or gang rape. There were no reports of sexual violence perpetrated by paramilitary groups. That these groups were permitted to commit numerous selective assassinations and sometimes large-scale massacres without punishment from the military high command, *but* did not use this latitude to also engage in privately motivated acts of sexual violence does not support the opportunity model.

Also of significance to the opportunity model is the presence or absence of commanding officers during the commission of the criminal violence. The theory of sexual violence as opportunistic violence expressly rejects the possibility of the presence of leaders. It argues that principals do not want their subordinates to commit sexual violence, and therefore would prevent it or stop it from occurring if they could. The data from Peru indicate that commanders were present during at least 22 percent of all sexual violence cases. This is significantly higher than expected (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 35.8446$, $p < 0.001$). Commanders should neither be present, know of and not adjudicate, and certainly not order or otherwise encourage the use of sexual violence by their subordinates. Moreover, several members of the high-ranking military leadership are cited repeatedly as having been present during

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²⁷ Although community-based, the CADs are considered state armed groups because they were not only allowed to exist as armed militias, but were in fact funded and armed by the government. The administrations of Alan García (1985-1990) and Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) distributed approximately 10,000 rifles to some 4,000 self-defense groups (McClintock 1999).

²⁸ The Rodrigo Franco Command is a death squad that formed out of the ranks of *Dirección Contra el Terrorismo* (DIRCOTE, Counter-Terrorist Directorate, later renamed DINCOTE) and closely aligned to the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA, American Popular Revolutionary Alliance).

²⁹ The Colina Group is an anti-communist death squad created during Alberto Fujimori's presidency. It is responsible for the Barrios Altos, La Cantuta, and the Santa massacres.

³⁰ Given the rates of sexual violence in the database and the rate of violence perpetrated by self-defense groups, there is no significant difference between the expected and observed rates of sexual abuse by CADs (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 0.2918$, $p = 0.589$). The same is true for paramilitary organizations (Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 1.9692$, $p = 0.161$).

the commission of criminal violence, including Army Captain “Gato,” Captain Castro of the Guardia Republicana, Army Lt. “Negro” (equivalent to 1st Lieutenant in U.S. Army), Army Captain Chacal, Army Lt. Moran (equivalent to 1st Lieutenant in U.S. Army), and Army Major Zamore. Some of these same officers are direct participants in acts of sexual violence, including Police Captain Canchesto (director of the Castro Castro prison), Army Major Zamore, Army Captain “Gato,” Police Colonel Tello, Army Lt. Moran, and Colonel Maximo Rivera of DINCOTE Delta 5. Consider the following example:

Leonardo was at a meeting of the leftist political party *Izquierda Unida* (IU, United Left) on October 16, 1988 when he was arrested, accused of being a member of the Shining Path. “The government always said that all leftist organizations and political opposition groups were terrorist organizations, but that wasn’t so. In fact, a lot of members of these groups also had problems with the Shining Path” (CVR Testimonies 100403). Leonardo was blindfolded and taken by plainclothes officers of the *Policía de Investigaciones del Perú* (PIP, Peruvian Investigative Police)³¹ to the local PIP station. While detained he was subjected to severe psychological and physical torture. Officers threatened to capture his parents and treat them the same way if he did not cooperate with them. Coronel Cubillas Arizaga and Captain Lizarraga oversaw the torture of Leonardo and actively participated in what they called *la mariposa* – where the prisoner is forced to stand with his hands tied behind his back, is submerged in water and then electrocuted on his tongue, armpits and testicles (CVR Testimonies 100403, 100471, 100472). The participation of such high-ranking officials within the organization and the context in which the violence was perpetrated (during interrogations and an attempt to force the prisoner to sign a confession) indicates that this violence was not purely opportunistic. It was not motivated by low-level members acting on their own behest to satisfy personal desires for power or gratification.

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³¹ The PIP is comparable to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).




Figure 14 Human Rights Violations by State Armed Actors




Figure 15 Human Rights Violations by Non-State Armed Actors

Concluding Remarks

This paper introduced a new dataset on wartime sexual violence and other forms of political violence during the Peruvian civil war. The previous sections described the “who, what, when, where and how” of violence during the war. The intention of this statistical description is to provide a more accurate accounting of violence during the war, and to more precisely test the implications of one theory of wartime sexual violence.

The data present the profile of a “typical” victim of sexual violence, one that is new and distinct in important ways from what was previously known about the war. On average, this person is older than previously thought, lives a more urban lifestyle, and is more educated, and more densely targeted for violence. Similarly, the data indicate that these individuals were most likely women, raped or gang raped by male soldiers.³² These attacks most likely occurred in their homes or in a secluded area in the village where they reside, and were not committed to illicit information from the victim regarding the membership, movement or location of weapons of the opposition.

Considered alone, this pattern of perpetration *could* be suggestive of an opportunity model of violence. However, when all the evidence is taken together and the *multiple* patterns of sexual abuse are documented, it becomes evident that opportunity only partially explains the use of sexual violence during the war. For instance, what of disproportionate targeting of teachers and professors for sexual abuse? Why do patterns of sexual and other forms of violence, such as murder, differ in significant ways? How do we account for the more than one in five acts of sexual violence that is perpetrated with the full knowledge and acquiescence (as demonstrated by their presence) of commanding officers? The opportunity model of violence cannot easily answer these questions. In the next stages of the dissertation project, I outline an alternative explanation of sexual violence based on feminist theories of gender-based violence and rational-actor models of counterinsurgency warfare. I provide evidence of the highly patriarchal and hetero-normative values within the state armed forces that encourage soldiers to view sexual violence as a legitimate and effective weapon to torture political prisoners and to terrorize and control rural populations.

These findings described above should not be interpreted as *the* definitive account of wartime sexual violence in Peru. In fact, I contend that no such story exists. Rather, it is my intention and hope that these findings will be used by scholars as the starting point for more rigorous analysis of variation in the repertoires of violence that lead to a more complete understanding of its causes in war.

³² In fact, there is only one case of sexual violence perpetrated by a woman in the entire database.

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Appendix A: Definitions of Political and Sexual Violations

Forced Disappearance- “the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time” (ICC 1998 <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/rome fra.htm>).

Detention- the arbitrary arrest and/or deprivation of one’s liberty and freedom of movement. Detention is distinguishable from other crimes in which an individual is deprived of his/her liberty in that it is a more formal process and occurs within state-run detention facilities, such as prisons or military bases. By definition, then, *only* members of the state security forces could commit an act of detention.

Forced Recruitment- the forced participation in active combat or other armed operations

Kidnapping or Informal Detention- the arbitrary deprivation of one’s liberty and freedom of movement, but which does not occur within formal detention or security institutions. Perpetrated by either state or non-state armed groups, kidnappings and other informal detentions include any act where a person is taken and held against his/her will for a period of time in a location that is not legally sanctioned as a holding facility.

Extrajudicial Execution- any homicide, whether individual or collective, committed in the context of the civil war that is perpetrated by members of the state armed forces, a non-state armed group, or other armed actor outside of the judicial process and without due process.

Battle-Related Death- any death that occurs during and in the context of an ongoing battle.

Massacre- an act that results in the extrajudicial execution of five or more persons outside of the context of the battlefield or who are otherwise in an indefensible position at the time of the attack. This definition has been adopted by several human rights institutions, including the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Battle Massacre- an act that results in five or more battle-related deaths.

Injury- an act that results in serious bodily harm, but which cannot be classified as torture.

Torture- “the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions” (ICC 1998 <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/rome fra.htm>).

Sexual Violence- represents the broad spectrum of violations that are sexual in nature.

Rape- the invasion “of the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body (ICC 1998 <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/rome fra.htm>).

Gang Rape- any act of rape that is committed by more than one perpetrator. In cases that mentioned multiple victims of rape by multiple perpetrators, but gave no details on the number of perpetrators involved in each attack against each individual victim, the violation was recorded as rape, not gang rape (“the soldiers raped the women in the community”). The same is true for individual victims of multiple rapes over time by multiple perpetrators, but where the number of perpetrators involved in each attack is not specified (“the woman was raped many times by the officers”).

Sexual Torture- any form of sexual violence, which causes severe pain and suffering to the victim, whether physical or psychological.

Sexual Mutilation- any form of sexual violence that results in the removal of or permanent damage to or scarring of the victim’s reproductive and/or sexual organs.

Sexual Humiliation- any offense of a sexual nature whose primary goal is to humiliate and degrade the victim, but which does not use direct physical force and which does not result in physical injury.

Attempted and Threatened Acts of Sexual Violence- any attempted or threatened acts of rape, gang rape, sexual torture, sexual mutilation, sexual humiliation, or some other, unspecified form of sexual violence.

Unspecified Acts of Sexual Violence- any unspecified type of sexual violence, such as “sexual abuse,” “sexual violence,” or “sexual attack.”